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 2 
RFRA SHIELDS RELIGIOUS HUMANITARIAN ACTS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO 
BORDER FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND UPHOLDS RELIGIOUS 
OBJECTION TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BORDER WALL  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations has characterized the U.S.-Mexico border “as one of the deadliest for 
migrants.”1 Since 2014, approximately 2,403 migrants have died trying to cross the U.S. southern 
border.2 In 2019 alone, the Missing Migrants Project (“MMP”) recorded 497 deaths3. Religious 
activists have tried to alleviate some of the suffering occurring at the border by providing legal 
assistance, shelter, and basic supplies such as food and clothing.4 Because of their humanitarian 
actions, some religious figures have been criminally prosecuted.5  
But criminalization of religious humanitarian acts has not been the only subject of debate 
at the U.S.-Mexico border. On June 16, 2015, while announcing his presidential campaign, Donald 
J. Trump touted the idea of building a wall along the southern border and affirmed that Mexico 
would pay for it.6 Throughout his presidential campaign, Trump continued advocating for the 
construction of the border wall, and this promise soon became one of the highlights of his 
campaign.7 On January 20, 2017, Trump became the forty-fifth U.S. President.8 Five days after his 
 
1 UNICEF/Balam-ha Carrillo, 2019: A deadly year for migrants crossing the Americans, UN NEWS (Jan. 20, 2020), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1056202.  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Catholic Extension, 5 Catholic Ministries Helping Migrants at the Border, CATHOLIC EXTENSION (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.catholicextension.org/stories/5-catholic-ministries-helping-migrants-border/.  
5 Katherine Franke, Professor Katherine Franke Comments on Federal Court Conviction of Four Migrants’ Rights 
Activists for Leaving Water and Food in the Arizona Desert , COLUM. LAW SCHOOL LAW, RIGHTS, AND RELIGION 
PROJECT (Jan. 19, 2019), https://lawrightsreligion.law.columbia.edu/news/professor-katherine-franke-comments-
federal-court-conviction-four-migrants-rights-activists.  
6 Anu Joshi, Donald Trump’s Border Wall—An Annotated Timeline, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trumps-border-wall-an-annotated-timeline_b_58b5f363e4b02f3f81e44d7b.  
7 Id.  




inauguration, Trump signed the Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements 
Executive Order, which authorized “the immediate construction of a physical wall.”9 Trump’s 
Executive Order defined the wall as “. . . a continuous, physical wall or other similarly secure 
contiguous, and impassable physical barrier.”10 It also ordered the federal government to “. . . take 
all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern 
border . . .”11  
Through eminent domain, the Federal Government began taking private property for the 
construction of the border wall.12 Churches were among those affected, including La Lomita 
Chapel, a 120-year-old Catholic church in Mission Texas that sits in the path of Trump’s border 
wall.13 When the Federal Government sought to use the church’s property to begin preparations 
for the border wall, La Lomita Chapel objected on religious grounds.14  
Churches as well as religious activists at the U.S.-Mexico border are involved in efforts to 
sustain transborder faith communities and to alleviate the growing humanitarian crisis. Recently, 
these efforts have become the subject of religious freedom litigation under federal law. Section I 
establishes an introductory overview of the U.S.-Mexico border humanitarian crisis. Section II will 
discuss the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the main Supreme Court cases 
interpreting such. Section III will present two district court cases in which courts have applied 
RFRA to humanitarian acts at the U.S.-Mexico border. Section IV will explore the construction of 
 





12 John Burnett, Acquiring Private Land is Slowing Trump’s Border Wall , NPR (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/12/20/789725311/acquiring-private-land-is-slowing-trumps-border-wall.  
13 Lulu-Garcia-Navarro, The Historic Chapel At The Heart Of A Legal Fight Over The Border Wall , NPR (Feb. 10, 
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/10/693115073/the-historic-chapel-at-the-heart-of-a-legal-fight-over-the-border-
wall. 
14 Id.  
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the southern border wall and its effect on religious entities. Section V will conclude that 
criminalizing humanitarian acts at the U.S-Mexico border and taking churches’ property for the 
construction of the border wall violates RFRA. Because RFRA grants immense protection to 
religious liberty, this statute has and will continue to protect religious humanitarian acts at the U.S-
Mexico border and religious objection to the construction of the border wall.    
II. RFRA’S BECOMING  
Subsection A will present a brief introduction to the creation of RFRA. Subsection B will 
discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretation of RFRA concluding that RFRA’s protection is 
extensive and permissive when properly applied.  
A. RFRA’s Language and History   
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Sherbert v. Verner that a law restricting an individual’s 
free exercise right must further a compelling government interest.15 Sherbert involved a Seventh 
Day Adventist whose religion prevented her from working on Saturdays.16 Because of Sherbert’s 
unavailability to work on Saturdays, her employer fired her.17 Sherbert eventually filed for 
unemployment benefits but her application was denied.18 The Employment Security Commission 
found that Sherbert’s unavailability to work on Saturdays disqualified her from unemployment 
benefits because she failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work when offered.19 
On appeal, the Supreme Court conducted a two-step inquiry to determine whether the 
denial of unemployment benefits to Sherbert was constitutional.20 The Court first inquired “. . . 
whether the disqualification for benefits impose[d] any burden on the free exercise of [Sherbert’s] 
 
15 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963). 
16 Id. at 399. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 400-01. 
19 Id. at 401. 
20 Id. at 403, 406. 
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religion.”21 The Court concluded that the disqualification of benefits imposed a burden on 
Sherbert’s religion because her “. . . declared ineligibility for benefits derive[d] solely from the 
practice of her religion . . .”22 Sherbert was essentially forced to decide between “. . . following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits. . . [or]. . . abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work. . .”23 This condition on the availability of unemployment benefits 
effectively penalized her free exercise of religion.24  
The Court then considered whether a compelling government interest justified the 
substantial burden imposed on Sherbert’s free exercise right.25 The Court found the State did not 
advance a compelling government interest that would justify the substantial burden imposed on 
Sherbert’s free exercise of religion.26  
Nine years after Sherbert, the Supreme Court decided Yoder v. Wisconsin where it held 
that a law restricting an individual’s free exercise right was unconstitutional.27 Yoder implicated a 
Wisconsin statute that required school attendance until the age of 16.28 Members of the Old Order 
Amish religion and of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church refused to send their children 
to school after eighth grade, an action for which they were fined five dollars each.29 The Amish 
believers argued “. . . that their children’s attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary 
to the Amish religion and way of life.”30 The State stipulated this was a sincerely held religious 
belief.31  
 
21 Id. at 405. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 406. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.   
27 Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
28 Id. at 207. 
29 Id. at 207-08. 




In evaluating the Amish members’ free exercise claim, the Supreme Court found that 
sending children to school beyond the eighth grade . . . contravene[d] the basic religious tenets and 
practice of the Amish faith . . .”32 Similar to Sherbert, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin law 
compelled the Amish believers, “. . . under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably 
at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”33 The Court then rejected the difference 
between actions and beliefs as a ground for finding against the Amish believers.34 The Court 
further explained that a facially neutral regulation could discriminate against the free exercise of 
religion based on its application.35 
When analyzing whether the State had a compelling government interest in two more years 
of compulsory education after the eighth grade, the Court determined that the State needed to show 
“a more particularized showing . . . to justify the severe interference with religious freedom . . .”36 
The Court reasoned that the Amish community provided their children with suitable vocational 
education and the requirement for compulsory education after the eighth grade was a relatively 
recent development in our nation’s history.37 The Court also noted that “[a] way of life that is odds 
or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because 
it is different.”38 Therefore, the First Amendment protected the Amish from being compelled to 
send their children to school after the eighth grade in contravention to their religious beliefs.39  
Sherbert and Yoder established a strict scrutiny standard of review for government-
imposed burdens on religious exercise. However, the strict scrutiny standard  came to a halt in 
 
32 Id. at 218. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 220. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 227. 
37 Id. at 224-27. 
38 Id. at 224. 
39 Id. at 234. 
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1990, when the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that a law of general 
applicability is to be reviewed under rational basis review.40 In Smith, the plaintiffs consumed 
peyote as part of a sacramental ceremony of the Native American Church.41 Because Oregon law 
criminalized the use of peyote regardless of the purpose for consumption, the Oregon Employment 
Division denied plaintiffs unemployment benefits.42  
In reviewing the plaintiff’s free exercise claim, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that 
“[t]he free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever 
religious doctrine one desires.”43 The Court then explained that a textual reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause did not mean that the plaintiffs were excluded from a “. . . generally applicable 
law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that [their] religious belief forbids (or 
requires).”44 The Court emphasized that it had never previously held that “. . . an individual’s 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate.”45 To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would “. . . be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.”46  
However, the Court recognized an exception.47 Rational basis review does not apply in 
hybrid situations where a law of general applicability burdens an individual’s Free Exercise right 
in conjunction with other constitutional rights such as Freedom of Speech or Freedom of the 
Press.48 An example is Yoder where the Amish parents’ Free Exercise right and parental rights 
 
40 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990). 
41 Id. at 874. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 877. 
44 Id. at 878. 
45 Id. at 878-79. 
46 Id. at 879. 




were at issue.49 There the Court applied strict scrutiny rather than rational basis review.50 Smith, 
however, did not involve “such a hybrid situation[,]” and therefore the Court applied rational basis 
review.51 The Smith Court further clarified that strict scrutiny would continue to apply in cases 
such as Sherbert.52 Where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not 
refuse to extend that system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.53 Because 
Smith involved a law of generally applicability with no system of individual exemptions, this 
further supported application of rational basis review.54 Applying the most deferential standard of 
constitutional review, the Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits to plaintiffs was 
constitutional.55  
Shortly after Smith, then Representative Chuck Schumer introduced the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) bill to reject the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith.56 The House of 
Representatives passed the bill unanimously and the Senate approved it 97-3.57 RFRA states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection 
(b).  
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person— 





51 Id. at 882. 
52 Id. at 884. 
53 Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
54 Id. at 890.  
55 Id. Congress eventually recognized that “. . . peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the 
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church.”21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.  
56 Zeke J Miller, Democrats Caught Up in Controversial Indiana Religious-Freedom Law, (Mar. 29, 2015 6:37 PM), 
https://time.com/3762708/indiana-gay-religious-pence-clinton/.  




(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling government interest.58  
 
By enacting RFRA, Congress intended to adopt the strict scrutiny test as set forth in 
Sherbert and Yoder.59 Four years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court held in City 
of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA does not apply to the States.60  
B. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of RFRA 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal was the first Supreme Court 
decision to apply RFRA to a free exercise claim.61 Gonzales concerned the sacramental use of 
hoasca, a hallucinogen regulated by the Federal Government under the Controlled Substances Act, 
by a Brazilian Christian Spiritist sect of approximately 130 members.62 When the O Centro Espírita 
Beneficente União do Vegetal (UDV) tried to import three drums of hoasca into the United States, 
the Federal Government intercepted the hoasca shipment and threatened to prosecute the UDV.63 
In the district court, the Government conceded that “. . . application of the Controlled Substances 
Act would substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion by the UDV.”64 Nonetheless, the 
Government argued that application of the Controlled Substances Act was the least restrictive 
means of furthering three compelling government interests.65   
In evaluating the UDV’s Free Exercise claim, the Court first concluded that at the 
preliminary injunction stage, Congress intended RFRA challenges to be adjudicated in the same 
 
58 42 U.S.C. § 200bb-1. 
59 Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal , 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006). 
60 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Nowadays, approximately 21 States have enacted their own 
version of RFRA. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (May 04, 
2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.  
61 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430. 
62 Id. at 423, 425. 
63 Id. at 425. 




manner as any other applications of the compelling government interest test.66 This means that at 
a preliminary injunction hearing, the Government has the burden of proving a compelling 
government interest.67 The Court then noted that RFRA requires a specific rather than a general 
application of the compelling government interest.68 The Government must demonstrate that 
application of the law at issue is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government 
interest as applied to the claimant whose religion is substantially burdened by the law.69  
Applying strict scrutiny to the UDV’s free exercise claim, the Court reasoned that listing 
hoasca under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act did not provide a clear answer in favor 
of the Government, particularly because the Act allowed an exemption for religious use.70 Notably, 
the Court emphasized that RFRA vested courts with the power to recognize religious exemptions 
to a law of general applicability.71 The Court then rejected the Government’s arguments that a 
ruling in favor of the UDV would undermine the effectiveness of the Controlled Substances Act, 
and that making an exemption for the UDV would require that the Government makes an 
exemption for everyone else.72 The Court reasoned that RFRA’s intent was to mandate religious 
exemptions to laws of general applicability where the Government did not meet the compelling 
government interest test.73 The Court further explicated that the Government had not offered any 
evidence to substantiate its arguments.74 Congress, by enacting RFRA, required courts to strike a 
“sensible balance” through application of the compelling government interest test.75 Here, the 
 
66 Id. at 430. 
67 Id. at 429. 
68 Id. at 430-31. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 432-33. 
71 Id. at 434. 
72 Id. at 434-36. 
73 Id. at 436. 
74 Id. at 437-38. 
75 Id. at 439. 
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Government did not meet its burden of proving that a compelling government interest justified 
prohibiting the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca.76 Gonzalez represents a broad and permissive 
case-by-case basis application of RFRA. 
The Supreme Court’s next RFRA case was also exceedingly protective of religious 
exercise. In 2014 in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court applied RFRA to a free exercise 
claim of three closely held, for-profit corporations.77 Hobby Lobby involved the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, which required employers with fifty full-time employees or more to offer 
minimum health insurance coverage.78 Otherwise, they would incur a monetary penalty.79 The 
agencies in charge of interpreting the Act required employers to provide all FDA-approved 
contraceptives in their health insurance coverage.80  
Four of the FDA-approved contraceptives, commonly known as abortifacients, had the 
effect of preventing a fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus.81 The owners of the for-profit 
corporations argued that the abortifacients effectively cause an abortion, which was against their 
religious beliefs.82 The Government provided a religious exemption to nonprofit corporations that 
considered themselves a religious organization and opposed any of the contraceptives required by 
the contraceptive mandate.83 The three corporations, however, did not qualify for this 
accommodation given their for-profit nature.84   
In addressing the plaintiffs’ free exercise claim, the Court first noted that “RFRA was 
designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” and concluded that for-profit, 
 
76 Id. 
77 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 688 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
78 Id. at 696. 
79 Id. at 697. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 698. 
82 Id. at 700-05. 




closely held corporations are protected under RFRA.85 The Court then proceeded to evaluate 
whether the contraceptive mandate burdened the owners sincerely held religious beliefs.86 Because 
noncompliance with the contraceptive mandate resulted in monetary penalties, the Court 
determined that the owners’ defiance of the contraceptive mandate burdened the owners free 
exercise of religion.87 Next, the Court assumed without deciding that “guaranteeing cost-free 
access to four challenged contraceptives” was a compelling government interest.88 Applying strict 
scrutiny, the Court concluded that the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
regulations were not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.89 
Given that the Government made an accommodation for nonproof religious corporations opposed 
to the mandate, the Government had to accommodate for-profit corporations’ religious opposition 
to the contraceptive mandate as well.90 Hobby Lobby reinforced the notion that where the 
government makes an individual exemption, it may not refuse to exempt religious opposition to 
the same law. 
The Supreme Court further provided an especially protective approach toward religious 
freedom when interpreting RFRA’s sister statute in Holt v. Hobbs. There, the Supreme Court 
evaluated whether a prison policy prohibiting a Muslin prisoner from growing a beard violated the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).91 Although growing a 
beard was forbidden, the prison allowed an exception for dermatological reasons.92 However, 
 
85 Id. at 706, 719.  
86 Id. at 719. 
87 Id. at 720. 
88 Id. at 728. 
89 Id. at 730. 
90 Id. at 736. 
91 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). 
92 Id. at 356. 
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when Holt sought permission to grow a beard, the prison guard refused permission stating that 
Holt would face the consequences if he grew a beard.93  
The Court evaluated Holt’s free exercise claim under RLUIPA, which allows prisoners “to 
seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.”94 The Prison 
did not challenge the sincerity of Holt’s religious beliefs.95 In addition, the Prison recognized that 
Holt was forced to decide between growing a beard and facing serious disciplinary actions or 
cutting his beard in violation of his religious beliefs.96 This predicament represented a government-
imposed burden on Holt’s free exercise of religion.97 The Hobbs Court reiterated that RFRA 
requires “application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere 
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened[,]” rather than a generalized application.98  
The Court rejected the Prison’s argument that it had a compelling government interest in 
preventing inmates from growing facial hair.99 The Court noted that the Department did not require 
“shaved heads or short crew cuts.”100 Therefore, the Court could not understand why inmates 
would hide contraband in their beards but not in their hair.101 The least restrictive means test 
required the Prison to show that it “. . . lack[ed] other means of achieving its desired goal without 
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting part[y].”102 Here, the 
Prison failed to show that it lacked other means of ensuring prison security.103 The Court also 
found unpersuasive the Prison’s failure to explain why the grooming policy was underinclusive in 
 
93 Id. at 359. 
94 Id. at 358. 
95 Id. at 361. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 363 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 364. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 364-35. 
103 Id. at 365. 
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that it allowed exceptions for medical reasons but not for religious purposes.104 The Court further 
rejected the Prison’s argument that allowing inmates to grow their beard would prevent prison 
guards from quickly identifying inmates.105 The Department did not present any evidence 
demonstrating that its prison system was different from other departments that allowed facial hair 
growth without affecting the prison’s security and quick identification of innates.106 In an 
unanimous decision, the Court held the grooming policy invalid.107  
Based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on RFRA, the following test is to be used 
when a court evaluates a free exercise claim: 
(1) Does claimant have a sincerely held religious belief? 
(2) Does the law at issue burden claimant’s sincerely held religious 
beliefs? 
(3) If so, is the law the least restrictive means (4) of furthering a 
compelling government interest?  
 
If a law burdens an individual’s sincerely held religious beliefs, it will be held  invalid 
unless the Government demonstrates that it is the least restrictive means to advance a compelling 
government interest. When evaluating an individual’s free exercise claim, courts should apply 
RFRA on a case specific basis, rather than making a generalized application. Courts should also 
consider whether the Government has presented any evidence to substantiate its arguments and 
whether the Government affords exceptions to the law but refuses to make a religious exemption. 
As seen in Gonzales, Hobby Lobby, and Holt, the Court’s statutory interpretation of RFRA places 
a heavy burden on the government to show that its law is indeed the least restrictive means to 
advance a compelling interest.  
 
 
104 Id. at 367. 
105 Id. at 366-67. 
106 Id. at 367. 
107 Id. at 369-70. 
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III. RFRA PROTECTS HUMANITARIAN ACTS AT THE BORDER FROM 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
 
Subsection A will describe a case in which a court mistakenly dismissed a claimant’s free 
exercise claim. Subsection B will introduce a successful RFRA claim.  
A. United States v. Warren 
  In 2018 in United States v. Warren, the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona addressed a humanitarian religious claim.108 Warren was arrested for providing food and 
water to two undocumented individuals at a property located in Ajo Arizona.109 Warren believed 
in animism.110 His religious beliefs included “. . . help[ing] others in distress to the point of being 
a duty or compulsion.”111 Because of Warren’s humanitarian acts, he “. . . was arrested for 
concealing, harboring, or shielding illegal aliens . . .”112  
 Warren filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him.113 But the court denied 
Warren’s motion on the ground that there were “unresolved questions of fact.”114 More 
specifically, the court explained that no testimony was presented to the effect that the statutes at 
issue compelled Warren to act contrary to his religious beliefs.115 Rather than testifying that 
Warren’s religion compelled him to aid undocumented immigrants, Warren simply stated that his 
religious beliefs required him to help those in immediate need generally.116 Warren, however, was 
accused of harboring undocumented immigrants “. . . whether or not they [were] in distress.”117 
Therefore, it was unclear whether all or some of Warren’s conduct conflicted with Federal 
 
108 United States v. Warren, 2018 WL 5257807 (May 31, 2018).  
109 Id. at *1-2.  
110 Id. at *1. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at *2.  





immigration laws.118 The court ultimately concluded that the statutes at issue did not substantially 
burden Warren’s Free Exercise right and declined to apply strict scrutiny.119 
 The Warren court misunderstood RFRA’s definition of religious. RFRA’s sister statute, 
RLUIPA, describes religion as “. . . any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.”120 The same definition applies to RFRA, meaning that 
RFRA protects mandatory as well as permissive acts. Under this definition, Warren was not 
required to prove that all of his conduct was compelled by his religious beliefs. As long as Warren 
proved he helped some immigrants in immediate need because his religious beliefs compelled him 
to do so, that should have been enough to shield Warren from criminal prosecution. If applied 
correctly, the Court should not have d ismissed Warren’s RFRA claim, finding that RFRA protects 
any exercise of religion whether permissive, mandatory or central to a system of religious belief.  
B. United States v. Hoffman  
While the court in Warren, dealing with a motion to dismiss, would not accept that religious 
freedom was implicated, the same court in United States v. Hoffman reversed four convictions on 
RFRA grounds.121 Hoffman implicated four volunteers with “No More Deaths/No Más Muertes,” 
a religious-based, charitable organization and ministry of the Unitarian Universalist Church of 
Tucson, Arizona.122 No more Deaths was founded in 1999 with the goal of providing food, water, 
and medical care for immigrants crossing the desert on foot.123 This organization tracked the deaths 
of immigrants and left supplies where human remains were recovered.124 
 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
121 United States v. Hoffman, 436 F.Supp.3d 1272 (2020).  
122 Id. at 1277.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
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The humanitarian acts at issue occurred in the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge 
(“CPNWR”), which contains trails immigrants use to cross the desert on foot.125 To enter the 
CPNWR, visitors are required to obtain permits and sign a hold harmless agreement.126 This 
agreement characterizes CPNWR as “one of the most extreme environments in North America” 
and one that “contains no sources of safe drinking water.”127 Shortly before the volunteers at issue 
entered the CPNWR, the permit application was amended to proscribe “. . . the leaving of ‘water 
bottles, water containers, food, food items, food containers, blankets, clothing, footwear, [and] 
medical supplies’ on the CPNWR.”128 
Without a permit, four volunteers with No More Death drove down a restricted-access road 
in the CPNWR to leave water and food along the foot trails immigrants use to cross the U.S.-
Mexico border.129 These humanitarian acts transpired at a time when a large number of immigrants 
were dying while attempting to cross “. . . the remote desert wilderness of southern Arizona on 
foot.”130 Despite Border Patrol recue beacons, in 2017 alone, “. . . 32 sets of human remains were 
recovered from the CPNWR.”131 Because of their humanitarian acts, which occurred in an area 
where immigrants often die of dehydration and exposure, the four volunteers were convicted for 
violating the CPNWR’s regulations.132          
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reversed the volunteers’ 
convictions.133 The court held that prosecuting the volunteers substantially burdened their 
sincerely held religious beliefs, and that the Government failed to demonstrate that the volunteers’ 
 
125 Id. at 1276-77.  
126 Id. at 1277.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 1278 (alteration in original).  
129 Id. at 1276-77.  
130 Id. at 1277.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 1276-77.  
133 Id. at 1289. 
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convictions was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.134 The 
court first described RFRA as a “very broad protection for religious liberty” and stated that RFRA 
can be used as an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution.135 To succeed on a RFRA claim, a 
claimant must demonstrate that the government action substantially burdens the claimant’s sincere 
exercise of religion.136 Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the Government to prove that the 
government action is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.137 
In determining whether the acts at issue constitute a sincere exercise of religion, the court 
cannot impose its “. . . perception of the particular belief or practice in question.”138 Under RFRA, 
religious beliefs . . . “do not need to be ‘acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others 
. . .’”139 Instead, the court defined religious beliefs under RFRA as those beliefs that are “sincerely 
held” and are considered “religious” under the claimant’s own scheme of things.140  
Applying the sincerely held religious beliefs test, the court found that the volunteers’ acts 
of leaving food and water along foot trails used by immigrants to cross the U.S.-Mexico Border 
constituted a sincere exercise of religion.141 The court found significant that, upon encountering 
the Fish and Wildlife (“FWS”) Officer who apprehended them, the volunteers identified 
themselves as members “from the Church in Tucson.”142 They also used a Unitarian Universalist 
Church truck to enter the CPNWR.143 The four volunteers further identified themselves with the 
religious practice of helping those who are in most need and in protecting the sanctity of human 
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life.144 The court reasoned that not professing beliefs of an established religion did not bar the 
volunteers’ affirmative RFRA defense.145 The court also rejected the Government’s argument that 
the volunteers’ religious beliefs were described in the “the broadest terms.”146 The court also 
disagreed that a RFRA claim deserves less protection because of an overlap with “political or other 
secular beliefs.”147 The court considered that the “areas of overlap [are] presumably protected.”148 
Moreover, the court did not find that the four volunteers sought to perpetrate fraud on the court.149  
The court next concluded that prosecuting the volunteers substantially burdened their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.150 The Government action essentially forced the volunteers to 
decide between practicing their religion or obeying the CPNWR’s regulations.151 The Government 
also failed to prove a compelling government interest that would justify the volunteers’ 
convictions.152 Even assuming that the Government had a compelling government interest, the 
Government did not demonstrate that criminal prosecution against the volunteers was the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.153 As such, the court reversed 
the volunteers’ convictions.154   
Unlike Warren, Hoffman correctly applied RFRA to the facts at issue. First, the Hoffman 
court accurately concluded that a religious belief under RFRA does not need to be an established 
religious belief, and more importantly, the court may not substitute its judgment for the claimant’s 
self-described religious beliefs. For example, in Yoder the Supreme Court emphasized that “[a] 
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way of life that is odds or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to 
be condemned because it is different.”155 The Hoffman court understood and applied this concept 
to the facts at issue.  
Second, relying on Hobby Lobby the court properly recognized that “[t]he substantial 
burden inquiry must not stray into a judgment as to whether a claimant’s beliefs are reasonable.”156 
The court further acknowledged that RFRA’s existence is meant to provide exemptions to laws of 
general applicability where appropriate.157 Unlike Warren, the Hoffman court rightly concluded 
that “Defendants do not need to show that their beliefs ‘required’ them to conduct their religious 
motivated activities on the CPNWR in order to succeed on their RFRA claim.158 Given that 
Defendants’ religious beliefs required them to save lives and that there was a growing number of 
deaths in the CPNWR, providing food and water was key to the exercise of Defendants’ religion. 
Thus, the Government’s prohibition on the leaving of water and food on the CPNWR substantially 
burdened the Defendants’ free exercise right.  
Third, the Hoffman court citing Gonzales correctly described RFRA’s compelling 
government interest standard as looking beyond “broadly formulated interests” and instead  
analyzing the specific harms involved.159 Because the Government did not prove that granting a 
specific exemption would frustrate the Government’s goal of preserving the CPNWR’s pristine 
nature, and the Government had granted a number of other exemptions, the Government’s stated 
compelling interests did not justify the burden imposed on the Defendants’ free exercise right.  
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Fourth, relying on Hobby Lobby again, the court noted that the least restrictive alternative 
test is extremely demanding.160 To satisfy the test, there must be no other alternative to accomplish 
the Government’s compelling interest.161 In Hoffman the Government failed to explain why a 
number of other alternatives would not work such as asking the volunteers to remove their trash. 
Similar to Hobby Lobby where the Government exempted nonprofit corporations from complying 
with the contraceptive mandate, but refuse to extend the same exemption to for-profit corporations 
or Hobbs where the Prison failed to explain why other prisons could securely allow prisoners to 
grow their beards but the Prison could not, in Hoffman the Government failed to prove that there 
was no other possible alternative of advancing its compelling government interests apart from 
convicting the volunteers. Hoffman represents a correct application of RFRA.  
IV. RFRA SUSTAINS RELIGIOUS OBJECTION TO THE BORDER WALL  
Subsection A will describe litigation that concerns the use of a church’s property to make 
preparations for the border wall. Subsection B will explore the political implications of taking 
religious property to construct a border wall. 
A. Bishop Flores 
In 2016, then presidential candidate Donald J. Trump promised to build a border wall along 
the U.S.-Mexico Border.162 To fulfill this campaign promise, the Trump Administration utilized 
the Federal Government’s eminent domain powers to take private property.163 The Federal 
Government has the right to take private property for Government use as long as the Government 
meets a number of requirements, including paying the private property owner “just 
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compensation.”164 Among the private property being taken for the border wall, the Trump 
Administration has attempted to seize the property of religious organizations.165  More specifically, 
the Government has sought two temporary easements from the Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Brownsville.166 One easement sought the property of “. . . La Lomita Chapel, a small, historic 
church that served the Catholic community in the Rio Grande Valley (“the Valley”) for over 100 
years.”167 The purpose of the easements was to “. . . conduct[] surveying, testing, and other 
investigatory work needed to plan the proposed . . . fencing . . . and related structures designed to 
help secure the United States-Mexico border within the State of Texas.”168 
Reverend Daniel E. Flores, the bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brownville, has 
opposed the Trump Administration’s efforts to take the Church’s property for the construction of 
the border wall.169 Bishop Flores refused to allow Government officials enter the Church’s land to 
make preparations for the border wall.170 According to Bishop Flores, utilizing the Church’s 
property to build a border wall . . . “would limit the freedom of the Church to exercise her mission 
in the Rio Grande Valley, and would in fact be a sign contrary to the Church’s mission.”171 As 
such, the Federal Government filed a Motion for Immediate Possession in the District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas.172  
The Diocese opposed the Government’s motion arguing that “. . . the proposed border wall 
is fundamentally inconsistent with Catholic values and, if completed, would substantially burden 
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the free exercise of religion by restricting access to La Lomita Chapel, a sacred site to the Valley’s 
Catholic community.”173 The Diocese further noted that the Government had not officially 
confirmed whether La Lomita Chapel would be removed to accommodate the construction of the 
border wall.174 But Bishop Flores believed that even if that La Lomita Chapel remained intact, the 
surrounding area of grass and trees would be destroyed.175  
The Diocese invoked an affirmative defense under RFRA arguing that the temporary 
easements on the Church’s property to make preparations for the border wall would substantially 
burden the Church’s sincerely held religious beliefs.176 The Diocese advanced two main 
arguments: first that the border wall “is inconsistent with Catholic teachings on the universality of 
human solidarity[;]” and second that a wall “is likely to lead to injury or death on land that currently 
belongs to the Diocese, contrary to the Catholic Church’s belief in the sanctity of human life.”177 
Although the Diocese recognized that the court could grant the Government’s Motion for limited 
purposes without substantially burdening the Church’s sincere exercise of religion, the Diocese 
refused to participate in “actions that it views as hostile to Catholic teachings and values.”178 The 
Diocese urged the Government to cease its efforts under eminent domain and to seek “. . . 
alternative methods of securing the border that will not undermine Catholic values or restrict 
access to La Lomita Chapel.”179 
In February of 2019, the court granted the government’s request to survey the Church’s 
property for possible border wall construction on the ground that such Government action would 
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not necessarily require access to La Lomita Chapel.”180 The court found that surveying the land 
did not substantially burden the Diocese’s sincerely held religious beliefs.181 
Following the court’s decision, Congress appropriated $1 billion for construction of the 
border wall but prohibited construction of a wall on La Lomita Chapel’s property.182 President 
Trump opposed this congressional appropriation by declaring a national emergency which would 
not only allow him to seek more funding but also to circumvent Congressional limitations on 
Government spending for the border wall.183 
B. The Political, Not the Judicial Outcome  
On January 25, 2017, the Trump Administration issued Executive Order 13767 which 
proclaimed that the executive branch’s immigration policy is to “. . . secure the southern border of 
the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, 
monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and 
human trafficking, and acts of terrorism.”184 Since Trump signed Executive Order 13767, Congress 
has appropriated approximately $4.5 billion to the Department of Homeland Security for “. . . 
construction of barriers where they do not currently exist.”185 Funding for the border wall has been 
subject of heated debate in Congress, causing a twenty-seven day Government shutdown in 
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2019.186 In 2019, the Department of Justice also advertised job postings for attorneys to handle 
border wall litigation in South Texas.187 As of December 7, 2020, the Federal Government built 
423 miles of Border Wall along the Southern Border.188  
The construction of the border wall has not only affected religious entities but has also 
caused great political debate along party lines, including from Texan Democratic Representative, 
Filemon Vela.189 Representative Vela introduced the Preventing the Taking of Americans’ Land 
to Build the Trump’s Wall Act, which would essentially prevent the Federal Government from 
engaging “. . . in quick take actions to build President Trump’s wall on the southwest border.190 
Democratic Senator of New York, Charles Schumer, also demanded Homeland Security Secretary, 
Kirstjen Nielsen, information about the Trump Administration’s use of eminent domain to acquire 
private property to build the border wall.191 Senator Schumer along with fellow Democratic 
Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois and Senators Tom Udall and Martin Heinrich of New Mexico 
expressed concerns about the La Lomita Chapel after the Federal Government sought easements 
to build on the property.192 More specially, the senators were concerned that a taking for the 
construction of the border wall would infringe the Diocese’s religious liberty.193  
The American Immigration Council also argued that building a border wall along the 
southern border was unnecessary, expensive, harmful to Native American land, wildlife and the 
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environment, and would present many complications due to its location along the Rio Grande 
River, not to mention that it would cause more deaths.194 
President Trump, on the other hand, described the Border Wall as a “big, beautiful wall.”195 
Some argue that promising to build a border wall handed then candidate Trump the White 
House.196 However, this campaign promise did not guarantee a second term for President Trump; 
and now President-Elect Biden threatens the fulfillment of Trump’s 2016 campaign promise.197    
C. Analysis  
A reviewing court would likely rule in favor of La Lomita Chapel. The Catholic church 
certainly has a sincerely held religious belief in advocating for human solidarity and in preserving 
human life. Although the usefulness of a border wall is debatable, a court is likely to recognize 
that the Government has a compelling government interest in border security. However, Gonzales 
requires a specific rather than a general application of the compelling government interest test. As 
Gonzales and Hobby Lobby demonstrate, RFRA requires the Government to prove that application 
of the law at issue is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest as 
applied to the claimant challenging the government action.  
Under Hobby Lobby, the Government will likely fail to demonstrate that taking or using 
La Lomita Chapel’s property for construction of the border wall is the only alternative of securing 
the U.S.-Mexico border. As the Arizona district court recognized in Hoffman, Hobby Lobby 
imposes a very demanding least alternative test in free exercise cases. La Lomita Chapel, for 
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example, could argue that its property constitutes a miniscule portion of the border wall, and 
securing this portion of the border could be achieved by using border patrol personnel or electronic 
surveillance. Moreover, failure to take the Chapel’s property for construction of the border wall is 
unlikely to overcome the construction of a 1,954-mile border wall. The U.S.-Mexico border is 
situated along unsteady terrain. The Government will likely exempt construction of the border wall 
in cases where the terrain does not permit for construction. If the Government makes an exception 
for unsteady terrain, it must also make an exception to permit the exercise of religious freedom.   
V. CONCLUSION  
RFRA is exceedingly protective of religious liberty. If properly applied, RFRA would 
protect Warren’s and Flores’s free exercise claims, and a reviewing court would uphold Hoffman. 
The Government cannot criminalize religious humanitarian acts at the border unless it shows that 
criminalization is the only alternative to further a compelling government interest , which it is 
unlikely to prove. Similarly, the Federal Government may not take or use churches’ property to 
build or make preparations for the border wall. Doing so would substantially burden the churches’ 
free exercise of religion and the Government is unlikely to demonstrate no alternative to the taking 
of religious property. Therefore, RFRA has and will continue to protect religious humanitarian 
acts at the border and uphold religious objection to the construction of the border wall.  
